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SECTION 482: REALLOCATION OF PERSONAL
SERVICE CORPORATION INCOME TO
SHAREHOLDERS
Paul G. Marcotte, Jr.t
Whether income earned by an incorporated personal service
business is taxable to the individual or to the corporation is often
the subject of reallocation proceedings brought by the Internal
Revenue Service. In this article the author discusses the theories
underlying income reallocation and the applicable Internal Rev-
enue Code sections, focusing on section 482. The author ana-
lyzes in detail the factors courts consider in permitting or
denying reallocation and identfies the conflicts among the cir-
cuits in the interpretation and application of section 482.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a generally accepted rule of tax law that an individual is enti-
tled to arrange his business affairs so as to minimize his overall tax
liability. The classic statement of this principle is Judge Learned
Hand's comment:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing
sinister to so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right,
ror nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contri-
butions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere
cant.'
Because of various nontax,2 as well as tax,3 considerations, indi-
viduals often choose to incorporate their personal service businesses.
t B.S., University of Maryland, 1976; C.P.A., 1978; M.B.A., University of Mary-
land, 1981; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, 1981; LL.M., Taxation,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1983; Associate, Stein, Sperling, Bennett &
DeJong, Rockville, Maryland; Member, Maryland and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissent-
ing). For an analysis of the distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax
evasion, see Balter, A Practioner's Guide to Avoidance v. Evasion: Basic Concepts
Change, 37 J. TAX'N 12 (1972); Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the
Law of TaxAvoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968); Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH.
L. REv. 733 (1968); Lipnick, Business Purpose and Income Taxes: From Gregory to
Goldstein, 46 TAXEs 698 (1968); Scheifly, Commissioner's Attacks Upon Personal
Service Corporations, 1970 TUL. TAX INST. 336; Wolitzer, What Factors Will
Cause a Transaction to be Classified as a Sham by the IR.S. 4 4 TAX'N FOR ACCT.
30 (1969); Note, LR.S. Fights Corporations Formed to Avoid Taxes, 4 TAX'N FOR
LAW. 230 (1976).
2. Traditional nontax reasons for incorporating one's business include limited legal
liability, continuity of ownership and centralized management. See infra note 16.
3. Formerly, the principal tax advantages to be gained by incorporating one's bus-
iness included the lower overall corporate income tax rates and the more generous
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However, the many substantial tax advantages gained by incorporating
one's personal service business have made such arrangements vulnera-
ble to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attack on the theory that the
retirement plan contributions available under corporate-sponsored retirement
plans. However, recent legislation has dramatically reduced these advantages.
For tax years prior to 1982, the upper tax bracket for individual taxpayers
reached 70%, while the upper tax bracket imposed on corporate taxpayers was
46%. This disparity was greatly reduced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). Section 101 of ERTA re-
duced the top tax bracket on individuals to 50%, effective for 1982 and years
thereafter. The top corporate tax rate was left unchanged at 46%. For business
taxpayers, there is a disparity of only 4% in the maximum tax rates between incor-
porated and unincorporated businesses. However, within certain income levels,
incorporation can still reduce overall income tax liability even after ERTA. See
infra note 4.
A substantial reason for the incorporation of many personal service busi-
nesses (particularly professional persons) has been eliminated by legislation. The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (1982), provides for parity between retirement plans established by corpora-
tions and unincorporated businesses. Currently, self-employed taxpayers are al-
lowed to contribute to a Keogh or H.R. 10 retirement plan up to 15% of earned
income, not to exceed $15,000 per year. I.R.C. § 404(e)(1) [hereinafter, all refer-
ences will be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise
indicated]. In contrast to a defined contribution retirement plan, a corporate tax-
payer can currently contribute to a pension or profit sharing plan on behalf of an
employee up to a maximum of $45,475.00. Id § 415(c)(l)(A). If a defined benefit
plan is established by a corporate taxpayer, the maximum contribution permitted
is the amount calculated to provide the retiree-employee with an annuity not ex-
ceeding $136,425.00 annually. Id § 415(b)(1). These contribution limitations are
adjusted upward annually for any increase in the cost of living. Id § 415(d).
TEFRA reduced the contribution limitations for qualified retirement plans
maintained by corporations. The maximum contribution that can be made to a
defined contribution retirement plan was reduced from $45,475.00 to $30,000.00.
TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 235(a), 96 Stat. 324 (1982). The maximum contri-
bution that can be made to a defined benefit pension plan was reduced from
$136,425.00 to $90,000.00. The cost of living adjustment for the maximum contri-
bution limitation is frozen for years before 1986. Id § 235(c). At the same time,
the contribution limitation formerly imposed on Keogh or H.R. 10 plans main-
tained by self-employed individuals was repealed. Id § 238. These new limita-
tions are effective generally beginning in 1983 for plans already in existence and
immediately for new plans. Id § 235(g).
TEFRA also provides additional requirements for qualified retirement plans
which are treated as "top-heavy," a new term introduced by TEFRA to describe
plans which concentrate benefits in favor of key employees. A detailed descrip-
tion of the top-heavy provisions and other pension changes made by TEFRA is
beyond the scope of this article. However, the requirements for such plans in-
clude minimum contributions for nonkey employees and stricter vesting sched-
ules. See id § 240 for additional requirements.
As a result of TEFRA, there is no longer any practical difference between a
corporate versus noncorporate retirement plan. Recognizing that many profes-
sionals had incorporated to achieve more favorable retirement plans, Congress
has provided a means for many personal service corporations to liquidate without
sizable tax liabilities. Section 247 permits personal service corporations to liqui-
date during 1983 and 1984 under the provisions of I.R.C. § 333 (one month liqui-
dation) without realizing income on liquidation from uncollected receivables if
the corporation uses a cash-basis accounting system. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 247, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
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corporation's income is in fact earned by the individual shareholder
and therefore should be taxed as such. As a result, the courts have had
to face competing policy considerations. The use of the corporation as
a separate taxable entity can reduce the overall impact of the graduated
income tax rates,4 blurring the distinction Congress intended to create
between individual and corporate tax rates. At the same time there is
strong precedent recognizing the validity of corporations for tax
purposes.5
4. Assume for example that an individual is earning $40,000 in a sole proprietorship,
is single, and has no other income or deductions. As a sole proprietor, this indi-
vidual would pay federal income tax of $10,968 in 1982. If the individual incor-
porates his business, overall tax liability changes. Assume further that the
corporation earns $40,000 before payment of the shareholder's salary and then
pays the shareholder $20,000 as the reasonable value of services he provided to
the corporation as an employee. The corporation pays income tax of $3,200 on
corporate taxable income of $20,000 ($40,000 income minus $20,000 shareholder's
salary) in 1982. The shareholder pays federal income tax of $3,442 on the $20,000
salary, which is his only source of income in 1982. The combined tax liability of
the shareholder and corporation is $6,642 as compared to $10,968 if the share-
holder operated the business as a sole proprietor. The net tax savings of $4,326 is
due to the difference between individual and corporate tax rates.
As the level of business income increases, the benefit of the corporate income
tax rates is reduced. As a result of ERTA, the disparity between the top tax brack-
et for corporate and individual taxpayers has been reduced to a mere 4%. There-
fore, as the level of business income increases, there is now a lesser incentive to
incorporate. See also supra note 3.
Incorporation can also increase the payroll taxes paid by the business. As a
sole proprietor, the hypothetical individual in the example above would pay a
self-employment tax of 9.35% on his net earnings from self-employment. By in-
corporating his business, the former sole proprietor becomes an employee of the
business. Compensation paid to the shareholder as an employee of the business
would be subject to combined federal social security taxes (FICA) of 13.4%, as
well as federal and state unemployment taxes.
5. In Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C.
1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit attempted to balance the competing policy consider-
ations involved in taxing personal service corporation income to its shareholders.
On the one hand, the court recognized that the impact of the graduated income
tax rates is reduced when income can be divided artificially among several taxpay-
ers. On the other hand, this factor must also be balanced against the policy of
favoring recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity. The following
factors were stated by the court to be relevant in this situation:
(1) whether the corporation and not the taxpayer is the party to the con-
tracts under which services are performed; (2) whether the corporation is
recognized to be a viable, taxable entity and not a mere sham; (3)
whether nontax business purposes are present even though tax avoid-
ance is apparently a major concern; (4) whether the corporation has not
been formed for the purpose of taking advantage of losses incurred by a
separate trade or business; (5) whether the corporate form (and the status
of the corporation as an actual operating enterprise) has been consist-
ently honored by the taxpayer and other parties to the transactions giv-
ing rise to the income; (6) whether the taxpayer does not render services
as an employee to any entity other than the corporation; (7) whether the
corporation is not disqualified from performing the services required of
it by contract because the law requires these services to be performed by
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The IRS has advanced numerous theories to reallocate the income
generated by personal service corporations to the shareholders of those
enterprises. To date, no one theory has dominated; however, recent
case law suggests that reallocation pursuant to section 4826 is the more
appropriate approach.
This article briefly examines these various theories and focuses
upon the use of section 482 as a reallocation vehicle. Analysis of recent
case law will highlight the factors relied upon by the courts when de-
ciding whether to permit or to deny income tax deficiency assessments
resulting from the reallocation of a corporation's income to its
shareholder.
II. INCOME REALLOCATION THEORIES OTHER THAN
SECTION 482
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue is empowered by Con-
gress to reallocate income whenever he determines that such realloca-
tion is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect
income.' Such income reallocation is most frequently triggered by the
incorporation of a personal service business which was previously oper-
ated as a sole proprietorship.' After incorporation, the corporation,
rather than the individual shareholder, reports the income and deduc-
tions associated with the active conduct of the personal service busi-
ness. Since there is generally no substantial change in the manner in
which the business is conducted after incorporation, the incorporation
process may be seen as a mere shuffling of papers. In such cases, it may
be difficult to distinguish between the corporation and its shareholder
as to the true earner of the income.
an individual; and (8) whether the entities paying or providing the in-
come are not controlled or dominated by the taxpayer.
621 F.2d at 868-69; see also Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436
(1943). There the Supreme Court stated:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life.
Whether the purpose is to gain an advantage under the law of the state
of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors
or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as
that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity . ...
Id at 438-39 (citations omitted).
6. I.R.C. § 482.
7. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 269, 482.
8. Operation of the business by an individual prior to incorporation is a common
factor in reallocating income. However, this has not been controlling in any case
decided to date. See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir.
1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir.
1982); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aft'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Borge v. Commissioner, 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 816 (1967), af'd, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933,
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
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This problem most typically arises in the case of the one person
corporation where the shareholder functions as both an owner and em-
ployee of the business.9 Under these circumstances, any separation of
control between the owner-employee and the corporation is difficult, if
not impossible, to produce. The Commissioner often takes the position
that the income generated by the business is properly taxable to the
shareholder and not to the corporation, because the shareholder-em-
ployee actually controls the earning of the business income.' °
The Commissioner relies upon several theories to justify the real-
location of income from a personal service corporation to its share-
holder-employees. These theories include: (1) the sham corporation or
alter ego theory;" (2) the section 269 bar against acquisitions with a tax
avoidance purpose;' 2 (3) the section 61 assignment of income doc-
trine; 3 and (4) reallocation under section 482.14
A. The Sham or Alter Ego Theory
The Commissioner has consistently attempted to attack personal
service corporations by claiming that they are merely shams or the alter
egos of their owners.' 5 This theory has not, however, been favorably
received by the courts. According to the United States Supreme Court,
9. See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand,
77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Rubin v.
Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), affid
per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882
(1982); Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Keller v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982); Borge v.
Commissioner, 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 816 (1967), a7'd, 405 F.2d 673 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
The theory behind a corporation for business and tax purposes is that the
corporation is an entity separate and apart from its owners, the shareholders. Pro-
vided the corporation is so operated, it is considered a separate artificial person.
The shareholders generally have only an investment interest in the corporation,
with management decisions vested in the board of directors and the officers.
10. Compare Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982) (corporation found to con-
trol earning of income) and Davis v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1034 (1975) (same)
with Borge v. Commissioner, 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 816 (1967), aft'd, 405
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869
(1969) (taxpayer held to control earning of income).
11. See, e.g., Epperson v. United States, 490 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1973).
12. See I.R.C. § 269.
13. See I.R.C. § 61.
14. See I.R.C. § 482.
15. See, e.g., Epperson v. United States, 490 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure to follow
corporate formalities, income reallocated to shareholder); PhiUipp Bros. Chem.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970) (five commonly controlled for-
eign corporations were regarded as shams and their income was reallocated to the
common parent). But cf. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir.
1980) (corporation held not to be a sham despite strong tax avoidance motive), on
remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982);
Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964) (same), aft'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cr.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
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when a corporation is either organized for a business purpose or actu-
ally carrying on a business activity, it remains an entity separate and
apart from its shareholders.' 6 However, when the shareholders have
disregarded the corporate entity and treated the business as their own,
the courts have not hesitated to declare the corporation a mere sham
and reallocate its entire income to the shareholders.' 7
Such disregard and resulting reallocation is found in Roubik v.
Commissioner. 18 In Roubik, four radiologists formed a professional
service corporation and each of the physicians entered into an employ-
ment contract with the corporation. After incorporation, however,
each physician continued to engage in his individual practice. In fact,
no contracts were entered into with local hospitals substituting the cor-
poration for the individual physician as the provider of services. In-
stead, checks made payable to the physicians were endorsed over to the
corporation. 9 The tax court determined that the corporation was not
the true earner of the income it reported, but rather a mere shell.2" As
a result, the income allegedly generated by the corporation was reallo-
cated to the four physicians.
B. Section 269 Tax Avoidance Purpose
An alternative theory relied upon by the Commissioner to deny
the advantages of the corporate form to a personal service business
16. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943) (gains from
sale of real estate held properly taxable to corporation rather than to shareholder;
corporate entity not ignored as fictitious). Generally, a valid business purpose will
be found if one of the reasons for incorporating the business was to limit legal
liability, achieve centralized management, or achieve continuity of ownership.
The courts have, similarly, indicated that only minimal activity is necessary to
satisfy the business activity requirement. See, e.g., Bass v. Commissioner. 50 T.C.
595 (1968), where the corporation's investment in working interests in oil and gas
leaseholds was held to be a sufficient business activity. In that case, the tax court
indicated that whether a corporation is a sham should not depend upon the per-
sonal purpose of the shareholder in forming the corporation; rather, the key test is
the purpose to be accomplished through the corporation. If the purpose is to carry
on a business activity, or the corporation is in fact carrying on a business activity,
it is not to be disregarded. Id at 601-02; see also Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.
566 (1966) (investment in joint venture engaged in foreign farming operations
satisfied business activity requirement), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 7; Cukor v. Commis-
sioner, 27 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 89 (1968) (fact that corporation became a
partner in a joint venture supported petitioner's contention that the corporation
was engaged in a substantial business activity and was not a sham).
17. See, e.g., Patterson v. Commissioner, 25 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1230, 1235
(1966) (taxpayer's controlled corporation disregarded due to failure to follow cor-
porate formalities; taxpayer held not to have put flesh on bones of corporate skele-
ton sufficiently for it to be recognized for tax purposes), affd, 68-2 U.S. TAX CAS.
(CCH) 9471 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
19. Id at 372. In fact, the hospitals were not notified of the existence of the corpora-
tion until the time of trial. Id
20. Id at 379, 381. The tax court likened the corporation to nothing more than "a
mere set of bookkeeping entries and bank accounts." Id at 379.
19821
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 12
arises under section 269.21 This section provides that if any person ac-
quires control of a corporation for the principal purpose of evading or
avoiding taxes by securing certain benefits the Commissioner may dis-
allow such benefits.22
The crucial question in applying section 269 to personal service
corporations is whether the formation of a corporation to secure the
benefits of more favorable retirement plan contributions and other
fringe benefits is a tax avoidance purpose. This question was recently
answered inAchiro v. Commissioner 23 where it was found that the peti-
tioners' principal purpose in forming a management corporation was to
obtain increased retirement plan benefits. 24 The tax court refused to
permit reallocation under section 269, specifically stating that the for-
mation of a corporation for the primary purpose of securing the bene-
fits of a retirement plan is not an evasion or avoidance of taxes.25
In Keller v. Commissioner," a case factually dissimilar to .4chiro
but also involving the issue of fringe benefits not available to self-em-
ployed persons, the tax court again refused to permit reallocation of the
corporation's income, stating:
The Code provisions relating to qualified retirement and
medical plans are a deliberate [Congressional bestowal of
21. Section 269 may be summarized to read:
[I]f any person or. . . corporation acquires. control of a corporation
• . . and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is
evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a
deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation
would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may disallow such deduc-
tion, credit, or other allowance.
I.R.C. § 269(b). In any such case, the Secretary is authorized to "distribute, ap-
portion, or allocate gross income, and distribute, apportion, or allocate the deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances the benefit of which was sought to be secured,
between or among the corporations .... ." Id
Although section 269 is generally applied to the acquisition of one corpora-
tion by another, the regulations indicate that it is equally applicable to an individ-
ual who incorporates. See Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b)(2) (1982); see also Coastal Oil
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957) (section 269 used to
deny surtax exemption to newly formed corporation). But cf. Rev. Rul. 76-363,
1976-2 C.B. 90 (section 269 not applicable to deny corporation advantages of Sub-
chapter S).
22. I.R.C. § 269.
23. 77 T.C. 881 (1981).
24. Id at 888. Although the Commissioner was not permitted to reallocate the corpo-
ration's income, the petitioners were denied the retirement benefits for which,
among other reasons, they had incorporated. Id at 905-08.
25. Id at 900; see also Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1029-30 (1981) (reallo-
cation denied although major purpose for incorporating was to achieve pension
plan benefits), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982). See gener-
aly Battle, The Use of Corporations by Persons Who Perform Services to Gain Tax
Advantages, 57 TAXEs 797 (1979) (author suggests that Commissioner is effec-
tively estopped from using section 269 to attack personal service corporations be-
cause the section has not been utilized in recent cases) [hereinafter cited as Battle].
26. 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982).
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benefits upon employers and employees; efforts to obtain the
advantages of these benefits, by way of conducting business in
the corporate form, are not to be deemed to render the tax-
payer culpable of illegal tax avoidance or evasion.
The trend, at least in the tax court, is clear. Section 269 is not an ap-
propriate vehicle for the reallocation of personal service corporation
income when the Commissioner's allegations are based solely upon the
shareholder's attempt to obtain or increase fringe benefits. Rather, the
Commissioner must utilize the more precise tools within his arsenal.
C. Section 61 Assignment of Income Doctrine
The section 61 assignment of income 2s doctrine is generally argued
by the Commissioner in conjunction with another of the reallocation of
income theories, particularly section 482.29 This doctrine states that in-
come is taxable to the one who earns it, and the tax on that income
cannot be avoided by an anticipatory arrangement. 30 The personal
service corporation is attacked on the theory that the shareholder,
rather than the corporation, earned the income in question and merely
assigned it to the corporation.
An example of the use of this doctrine is found in Johnson v. Com-
missioner3'where the taxpayer, a professional basketball player, con-
tracted his services to an unrelated corporation in return for a monthly
payment. At the same time, Johnson had an employment contract with
a basketball club. Although the corporation was not a party to this
contract, the club made payments under it directly to the corporation.
Since no contract, express or implied,32 existed between the corporation
27. 77 T.C. at 1030.
28. I.R.C. § 61.
29. See I.R.C. § 482; see, e.g., Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), afl'dper
curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Gettler v. Commissioner, 34 TAx CT. MEM.
DEC. (CCH) 443 (1975). See generaly Blend, Problems Arising From Imputation
of Corporate Income to Others, 35 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 637 (1977); Portugal,
U.S. v. Basye." A Metamorphysis in the Doctrine of Anticipatory Assignment?, 10
CAL. W.L. REV. 407 (1974).
30. See I.R.C. § 61. In Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930), Justice Holmes made
the classic statement of the assignment of income doctrine: that the court would
not recognize "arrangements by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew." Thus, a taxpayer may validly make a gratuitous
transfer of his income to another, but he remains liable for the income tax. Subse-
quent case law generally discusses the doctrine in terms of analogy to fruit of the
tree. Generally, if the taxpayer gives up all rights to property that produces in-
come, all income generated after that transfer will be taxed to the recipient and
not the transferor. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). For a more re-
cent case involving assignment of income principles, see United States v. Basye,
410 U.S. 441 (1973).
31. 78 T.C. 882 (1982).
32. Id at 893. In an earlier decision, Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604, 619
(1982), the tax court held that the required contract between the corporation and
service user could be oral or implied. However, in Johnson no implied contract
could be found because the basketball club had specifically refused to contract
19821
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and the club regarding the services provided by Johnson, the tax court
held that the payments were taxable as income to him.3 3 Relying on
assignment of income principles, the court viewed the arrangement as a
mere anticipatory assignment of income earned by the taxpayer.
A split of authority exists, however, as to whether the assignment
of income doctrine can be used to tax shareholders on corporate earn-
ings. The Second Circuit has held that section 482 is the preferable
approach in reallocating the income of a personal service corporation
to its shareholders.34 The tax court, on the other hand, has indicated
that the assignment of income doctrine may be used to reach the same
result as would a section 482 reallocation.35 The issue has been further
confused by two conflicting Seventh Circuit decisions rendered in the
same case, Foglesong v. Commissioner. 36 In its first opinion, the Sev-
with a party other than the taxpayer. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 893
(1982).
American Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971), presents another
fact pattern. In this case, two individuals held all of the stock in a corporation
which sold life insurance through outside agents. In addition, the two sharehold-
ers furnished management services to a local bank in return for fees which were
paid to the same wholly-owned corporation. The management corporation did
not pay any compensation for the services of the two nor did they enter into any
employment contracts. The tax court decided the case on assignment of income
principles, refusing to permit reallocation of the insurance commissions because
the income was actually earned by the corporation through outside agents. With
respect to the management services income, however, the court concluded that
such income was properly taxable to the shareholders because they, not the corpo-
ration, controlled the earning of the management fees. Id at 842.
33. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 893 (1982).
34. See Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155
(1971), a dper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972). In its first opinion, the
Second Circuit stated:
We believe the Tax Court erred in its approach to the problem. Resort
to 'common law' doctrines of taxation and the broad sweep of § 61 may
occasionally be useful in connection with 'transactions heavily freighted
with tax motives' which cannot be satisfactorily handled in other ways.
[B]ut they have no place where, as here, there is a statutory provision
adequate to deal with the problem presented . . . . Resort to section
482 is clearly superior to the blunt tool employed by the Tax Court
429 F.2d at 653.
35. See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982). In Keller, the tax court suggested that the assignment of
income doctrine leads to substantially the same result as an allocation under sec-
tion 482, and that the assignment of income doctrine can be used in a situation
where the corporation is not respected by the taxpayer-shareholder as a separate
entity. But cf Morrison v. Commissioner, 44 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1459,
1468 (1982). (court specifically refused to invoke assignment of income doctrine
which would effectively disregard the corporation).
36. 35 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1309 (1976), rev'd and remanded, 621 F.2d 865 (7th
Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982). In Foglesong, a taxpayer who was a sales representative for two steel
tubing companies incorporated his personal service business. The common stock
in the corporation was owned entirely by the taxpayer, his wife, and a small per-
centage by his accountant. The corporation issued preferred stock entirely to the
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enth Circuit held section 482 to be "generally" applicable, and in re-
gard to the applicability of the assignment of income doctrine, stated:
We believe that, where the issue is application of the as-
signment of income doctrine to effectively set aside the corpo-
ration, . . . an attempt to strike a balance between tax
avoidance motives and 'legitimate' business purposes is an
unproductive and inappropriate exercise. Such an approach
places too low a value on the policy of the law to recognize
corporations as economic actors except in exceptional circum-
stances, .... Here there are other more precise devices for
coping with the unacceptable tax avoidance which is unques-
tionably present in this case. But there is no need to crack
walnuts with a sledge hammer. .. .
Foglesong I was remanded to the tax court for consideration of the
issues surrounding the Commissioner's claim under section 482 and the
applicability of other more precise theories.38
On remand, the tax court held section 482 to be the appropriate
reallocation authority39 and the case was again appealed to the Seventh
Circuit. In Foglesong II the Seventh Circuit appears to have reversed
taxpayer's children. Substantial dividends were declared on the preferred stock,
but none were ever paid on the common stock. Thus, a substantial amount of
income generated by the corporation due to the personal efforts of Foglesong was
diverted to his children, who presumably were in a lower tax bracket. The tax
court determined that the corporation was not a sham and that Foglesong worked
exclusively for his corporation. 35 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 1312-13.
The first decision of the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong held that section 482
was preferable to the assignment of income doctrine in reallocating income from a
personal service corporation to the taxpayer. 621 F.2d at 872. On remand, the tax
court held section 482 applicable and determined that 98% of the corporation's
income was reallocable to the taxpayer. 77 T.C. at 1104, 1106-07. On the second
appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit apparently reversed its earlier reasoning and
held that since Foglesong worked exclusively for his corporation, the dual busi-
ness requirement of section 482 was not met. 691 F.2d at 872. The Seventh Circuit
did suggest that section 482 could be applied when a shareholder performed serv-
ices other than for his corporation. Id This most recent decision illustrates the
general advisability of having a covenant not to compete in effect between a
shareholder-employee and his corporation. Although Foglesong could not be
treated as a separate business for section 482 purposes, the court did not consider
whether he was a "separate organization" within the meaning of the section. The
case was then remanded to the tax court to determine whether assignment of in-
come principles could be applied to two issues: (1) reallocation of the dividends
to Foglesong on the preferred stock held by his children; and (2) reallocation of
commission income earned by Foglesong prior to incorporation but paid to the
corporation after it was formed, which then reported it as income for tax purposes.
Id
37. 621 F.2d at 872. The Seventh Circuit stated that although section 482 appeared
available to the Commissioner for purposes of reallocating the income of the per-
sonal service corporation to its shareholder, other statutory and common law doc-
trines with a more limited application are also available to combat abusive
situations. Id
38. Id
39. 77 T.C. at 1106-07.
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its decision in Foglesong L In this second opinion the court held sec-
tion 482 to be inapplicable and remanded the case, once again, for con-
sideration of whether assignment of income principles would be
available to combat the tax abuse alleged to exist in that case. n° Be-
cause of the confusion and conflict regarding the proper use of section
482 and the assignment of income doctrine, it appears that this issue is
ripe for Supreme Court review.
III. SECTION 482 IN GENERAL
Section 482 is a model of brevity seldom paralleled in the Internal
Revenue Code. It simply states:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized
in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
[Commissioner] may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the in-
come of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.41
The Treasury Regulations state that the purpose of section 482 is to
place a controlled taxpayer on the same basis in respect to the compu-
tation of true taxable income as an uncontrolled taxpayer, meaning
that the corporation and taxpayer must deal at arm's length to avoid
reallocation.42
A. Requirements and Burden of Prooffor Application of Section 482
Three requirements must generally be met in order to reallocate
income under section 482: (1) there must be two or more organizations,
trades, or businesses; (2) such enterprises must be owned or controlled
by the same interests; and (3) reallocation of income among the enter-
40. 691 F.2d at 853.
41. I.R.C. § 482. This section is derived from section 240(d) of the Revenue Act of
1921, which gave the IRS authority to consolidate the accounts of related trades or
businesses to prevent the arbitrary shifting of profits. See Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 260. This provision was reenacted as section 240(0 of
the Revenue Act of 1926 which gave taxpayers the right to require consolidation
of accounts. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 240(0, 44 Stat. 46. However,
section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928 eliminated this taxpayer right because tax-
payers, who would not otherwise be eligible to do so, were given the right to file
consolidated returns. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806. After
the Revenue Act of 1928, few changes were made to the statute. However, a sig-
nificant change was made in the Revenue Act of 1934 which added the term "or-
ganizations" to the classification of "trades or businesses" to broaden the scope of
that section. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 45, 48 Stat. 695.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1981). See infra note 52 for a discussion of the term
controlled.
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prises must be necessary in order to prevent the evasion of taxes or to
clearly reflect their respective income. The courts have generally held
that proof of a tax avoidance motive on the part of the taxpayer is not
required in order to utilize section 482. 3 Nevertheless these require-
ments have posed little obstacle to the IRS in reallocating personal
service income.
The requirement that there be at least two organizations, trades, or
businesses raises the question of whether the employment relationship
between the shareholder-employee and the corporation qualifies as a
trade or business for purposes of a section 482 reallocation. The treas-
ury regulation states that the term "organization" means "any organi-
zation of any kind, whether it be a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a
trust, . . .or a corporation, . . .irrespective of the place where or-
ganized, where operated, or where its trade or business is conducted,
* ,,44 The regulation also broadly defines the phrase "trade or busi-
ness" to include: "any trade or business activity of any kind, regardless
of whether or where organized, whether owned individually or other-
wise, and regardless of the place where carried on."' 45 The legislative
history of section 482 supports a broad construction of the phrase
"trade, business, or organization. '46  Despite arguments to the con-
trary,47 the courts have construed these broad definitions to include the
43. See Wilson v. United States, 530 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1976) (tax avoidance
motive not required before section 482 can be invoked when stock of corporation
providing consulting services was eventually transferred to children of taxpayer
and taxpayer received inconsequential compensation for his services); Rubin v.
Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (tax avoidance
motive immaterial); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1981) (Commissioner not
restricted under section 482 to cases of fraudulent, sham or avoidance-type activi-
ties).
However, at least one case has held to the contrary. See Ruddick Corp. v.
United States, 643 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (in absence of tax evasion or avoidance
motive, section 482 cannot be used to modify a transaction merely because some
income distortion may occur); see also Fuller, Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAX. L.
REv. 475, 529 (1976) (restraint in applying section 482 by Commissioner is neces-
sary and such restraint may take the form of distinguishing business and tax moti-
vated transactions) [hereinafter cited as Fuller].
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1981).
45. Id (a)(2).
46. The Report of the Ways and Means Committee states:
Under Section 45 of the existing law, the Commissioner has authority to
allocate items of income or deductions between trades or businesses
which are owned or controlled by the same interest, when such alloca-
tion is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes. While it is believed that the
language of the present law is broad enough to include "organizations,"
this word is added to remove any doubt as to the application of this
Section to all kinds of business activity.
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 545, 572
(emphasis added). See also supra note 41. The legislative history provides some
support to the courts in allocating the income of a personal service corporation to
a shareholder-employee, if the individual is considered an organization separate
and apart from the corporation.
47. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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employment relationship.48
However, at least one court has held that the mere employment
relationship between a shareholder and a personal service corporation
does not satisfy the dual business requirement. In the second opinion
rendered in Foglesong v. Commissioner,49 the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that section 482 could not be applied when a shareholder renders serv-
ices exclusively to his corporation because the individual is not engaged
in business apart from the corporation.50 Therefore, section 482 is po-
tentially applicable only when the shareholder does not work exclu-
sively for his corporation. By its holding in Foglesong II, the Seventh
Circuit refused to extend the scope of section 482 beyond the original
intentions of Congress. Whether other courts will follow the lead of the
Seventh Circuit remains to be seen.5'
The control requirement has similarly provided little assistance to
the shareholder-employee seeking to avoid an income reallocation.
Under the regulations control includes any kind of control, whether
direct or indirect and whether exercised or exercisable.12 The courts
have interpreted control expansively, requiring only the ability to con-
trol a corporation, not actual control, as a prerequisite to application of
section 482.51 Because of this interpretation, commentators suggest
48. See, e.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1981) (the dual business or
organization requirement is to be broadly construed), appeal docketed, No. 82-
1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982); Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155, 1162 (1971)
(tax court held that assignment of income doctrine may be used for the limited
purpose of finding an employee to be engaged in a trade or business separate and
apart from a corporation which employs him), all'dper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 124 (1964) (taxpayer held to be a
separate organization for purposes of section 482), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
49. 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
50. Id at 851.
51. The Second Circuit, in Rubin v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (per
curiam), has taken a contrary view of the issue. The court approved the decision
of the tax court that the taxpayer's rendering of management services through his
controlled corporation was the equivalent of a trade or business for purposes of
the dual business requirement of section 482. Id at 1218. Since both the Second
and Seventh Circuits are split on this issue, review by the Supreme Court is prob-
ably not far off.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1981) states that a prerequisite to the application of
section 482 is common ownership or control by the taxpayers. The treasury regu-
lation defines control as follows:
The term "controlled" includes any kind of control, direct or indirect,
whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is
the reality of the control which is decisive, not its form or the mode of its
exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions have
been arbitrarily shifted.
Id (a)(3).
53. See, e.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964) (fact that all stock was held in
corporation by taxpayer's relatives was irrelevant as taxpayer had sufficient con-
trol to have such stock transferred to her without consideration; actual control, not
record ownership, is the proper test), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 899 (1966); see also Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981) (54% of
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that the control requirement is largely irrelevant in the case of personal
service corporations, where typically only a few individuals will be
vested with management powers.54
The third requirement, that reallocation be necessary to prevent
the evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect income, appears to be presump-
tively met from the very outset. Section 482 is used when income or
deductions are arbitrarily shifted between a taxpayer and his corpora-
tion. The necessity of a section 482 reallocation is measured by
whether the shareholder deals with his controlled personal service cor-
poration as he would if it were uncontrolled. 5
This presumption flows from the burden of proof which generally
favors the Commissioner in section 482 reallocation disputes. The
Commissioner is vested with broad discretion under the tax law; his
determination will be overturned only if the taxpayer can show that
reallocation is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.5 6 Whether the
record title of stock in one corporation was held by taxpayer's brother, 24% by
taxpayer, and 24% by his associate; but since the brother agreed not to vote his
stock contrary to the taxpayer's wishes, the taxpayer and his associate were held to
have 100% combined control of the corporation's stock for tax purposes); Sun-
shine Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1379
(1981) (actual control, rather than record ownership, determines whether control
for section 482 purposes exists).
The application of the control requirement when control is not exercised
through equity ownership in the corporation is uncertain. However, an actual eq-
uity ownership in such enterprises is not strictly required. See Engineering Sales,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1975) (parents owned all the stock in
one corporation and their children owned all but .4% of the stock of a second
corporation; taxpayer conceded that corporations were controlled); Hall v. Com-
missioner, 32 T.C. 390 (1959) (required control existed where petitioner had a
"dominant influence" regardless of disputed actual ownership of stock), aff'd, 294
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961). But see Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S.
394 (1972). There the Supreme Court indicated that "control" exists only when
there is complete power to shift income among controlled corporations. However,
in this case no control existed because the banks to which the Commissioner
sought to allocate insurance premium proceeds could not, under state law, legally
receive such income.
54. See generally Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482 - Still Growing at the Age of 50, 46
TAXES 893 (1968) (trend of cases suggests that control will be found when neces-
sary to sustain allocation) [hereinafter cited as Seieroe & Gerber].
55. The treasury regulation states that the proper standard to determine whether a
reallocation is called for under section 482 is that "of an uncontrolled taxpayer
dealing at arm's-length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
l(b)(1) (1981). For an illustration of how this arm's-length standard is applied see
Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982); Estate of Cole
v. Commissioner, 32 TAx. CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 313 (1973).
56. See Wilson v. United States, 530 F.2d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1976); Phillipp Bros.
Chem. Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1970); Ballentine Motor Co.
v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963).
This burden of proof has been criticized as too strict with respect to a tax-
payer defending against a section 482 reallocation. See Erbacher, Are Courts
Making It Harder to Overturn an ZR.S. Allocation Under Section 482?" 46 J.
TAX'N 286, 290 (1977) (questions propriety of permitting Commissioner's determi-
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Commissioner has exceeded or abused his discretion is, therefore, a
question of fact subject only to a limited review by appellate
tribunals.57
B. Benefits of Section 482
Although a section 482 reallocation may be difficult to defend
against, it may subject the taxpayer to a lesser tax deficiency than if a
reallocation under section 61 is permitted. 8 Typically, in an assign-
ment of income case, 100% of the income involved is reallocated.
5 9
Section 482, however, may result in the reallocation of only a portion
of the income involved.6' This is particularly true when some part of
the corporate income sought to be reallocated is derived from invested
capital rather than from personal services rendered by a shareholder.6'
Furthermore, when the Commissioner asserts the section 61 assignment
of income doctrine, only the gross income generated by an activity is
reallocated.62 Under the statutory authority embodied in section 482,
however, the Commissioner is empowered to reallocate not only in-
come, but deductions and credits as well.6 3 Recent cases indicate a ten-
dency on the part of the Commissioner simply to reallocate net income
under section 482, rather than allocate income, deductions and credits
nation with respect to a section 482 reallocation to carry a presumption of correct-
ness as taxpayer is not left with many tools with which to defend against it);
Fuller, supra note 43, at 490 (in light of regulations under section 482, taxpayer
should not bear heavy burden of refuting Commissioner's allocation).
57. See Phillipp Bros. Chem. Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1970);
Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1963).
58. If income is reallocated from a personal service corporation to its shareholder
under authority of section 482, the shareholder may withdraw such funds from
the corporation without having the distribution taxed again as a dividend. See
Rev. Proc. 72-53, 1972-1 C.B. 198; Rev. Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 112.
A reallocation under section 482 may, however, have severe collateral conse-
quences to the taxpayer. For example, if the income to be reallocated consists of
passive income, a potential personal holding company tax problem arises. For a
Subchapter S corporation, the reallocation of passive income may serve to termi-
nate a Subchapter S election. Although these problems will seldom arise in the
case of a personal service corporation and its shareholder, the tax counselor
should be aware of possible collateral effects. See Seieroe & Gerber, supra note
54 at 904-06 (collateral effects may also include extension of the normal statute of
limitations from three to six years under I.R.C. § 6501(e) if the unreported income
which is reallocated exceeds 25% of the income reported on the taxpayer's return).
59. See, e.g., American Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971); Rubin v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), aff'dper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir.
1972).
60. See, e.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 127 (1964) (70% of corporation's in-
come reallocated to shareholder), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 899 (1966); see also Morrison v. Commissioner, 44 TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 1459 (1982) (only income from one of four tax years at issue reallocated
under section 482).
61. See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1034 (1975).
62. See cases cited supra note 59.
63. See I.R.C. § 482; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1981).
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separately.' Finally, although the statute speaks of "income," it has
been held that the Commissioner has the authority under section 482 to
reallocate losses between commonly controlled enterprises as well.65
IV. MISAPPLICATIONS OF SECTION 482
The various code provisions under which the Commissioner may
reallocate corporate income have distinct and differing requirements.
However, the Commissioner's practice of arguing the applicability of
several theories in conjunction with section 482 has blurred these dis-
tinctions, making it difficult to determine the fact pattern to which
section 482 will apply. The courts have added to this confusion by
sanctioning the Commissioner's combination approach and by failing
to specify the precise theories upon which their own decisions are
based.66
Analysis of the following three cases indicates that the courts have
often mistakenly relied upon section 482 when another code section
would have reached the same result. The primary argument raised by
the taxpayer in each case was that since other legislative safeguards had
been enacted to cover income allocation between a corporation and its
shareholders, Congress did not intend section 482 to apply.67 A com-
mentator has put forth this same argument, calling attention to the ob-
vious awareness by Congress of the tax advantages inherent in the use
of personal service corporations, since it modified other tax provisions
to include income derived from personal service contracts. 68 The logi-
64. See, e.g., Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963) (net
income allocation approved); Marc's Big Boy Prospect v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
1073 (1969) (taxpayer corporations have burden of demonstrating that total reallo-
cation of income of subsidiaries was unreasonable or arbitrary where various seg-
ments of franchised restaurant business were interdependent), arj'd sub nom. Big
Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971); Hamburgers York Road,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 821 (1964) (all taxable income of suburban branch of
store included in the income of the downtown store), acq. 1965-62 C.B. 5.
65. See Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 1978).
66. See generally Delsi, Section 482 Allocation of Income to Stockholdersfor Services
Rendered to Closely-Held Corporations, 72 UTAH L. REV. 491, 492 (1972) (discus-
sion of cases failing to disclose specific rule of law relied upon to reallocate
income).
67. Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650
(2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), affdper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Borge v. Commissioner, 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 816 (1967), affd, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933,
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
68. See Battle, supra note 25, at 801-02 (Congressional recognition of validity of per-
sonal service corporation can be inferred from enactment of section 543(a)(7)
dealing with personal holding company tax and personal service contracts). Sec-
tion 543(a)(7) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.- For purposes of this subtitle, the term "per-
sonal holding company" means the portion of the adjusted ordinary
gross income which consists of:
1982]
Baltimore Law Review IVol. 12
cal conclusion is that Congress intended to permit personal service cor-
porations to take advantage of tax benefits without being subject to
attack under section 482 and that the courts, by expanding the "dual
business" requirement to include shareholder-employees, have de-
feated the intentions of Congress.69
A. Ach v. Commissioner
One of the landmark reallocation decisions, Ach v. Commis-
sioner, 70 involved the transfer of a profitable dressmaking business to a
corporation having a history of substantial losses. The taxpayer, Pau-
line Ach, was the sole proprietor of a profitable dressmaking business
while other family members operated a dairy corporation which had
sustained substantial operating losses. In 1953, the dairy sold almost all
of its assets to an unrelated corporation.7 ' The taxpayer became presi-
dent and chairman of the board of the corporation while her sons, who
did not participate in the management of the business, owned all of the
corporation's stock. The taxpayer then sold her dressmaking business
to the corporation at book value, receiving in exchange a noninterest
(7) PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS.-
(A) Amount received under a contract under which the corporation is to
furnish personal services; if some person other than the corporation has
the right to designate (by name or by description) the individual who is
to perform the services, or if the individual who is to perform the serv-
ices is designated (by name or by description) in the contract; and
(B) Amounts received from the sale or other disposition of such a
contract.
I.R.C. § 543(a)(7).
Further support is given to this argument by I.R.C. § 531 which imposes a
penalty tax on the accumulated profits of any corporation if the purpose of the
accumulation is tax avoidance. Personal service corporations are restricted to an
accumulation of $150,000. ERTA, however, increased the accumulated earning
tax credit to $250,000 for nonservice corporations. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2). In addition,
the restrictions found in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
buttresses this argument. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. While
Congress clearly is aware of the controversy surrounding personal service corpo-
rations, it has not taken direct steps to halt their use.
69. At least one court has agreed with this proposition. In its second opinion in Fo-
glesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit stated:
"A history of legislation targeted at personal service corporations, the absence of
any special exclusion of such corporations from corporate taxation and the per-
sonal holding company tax provisions indicate that, to some extent, Congress has
sanctioned the incorporation of service businesses for tax purposes." Id at 873.
The Second Circuit and the tax court, however, have held that the legislation
involving personal service corporations does not provide a clear expression of
Congressional intent to limit the scope of section 482. See Borge v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 673, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1968) (fact that other legislation was enacted
does not mean Commissioner is restricted in application of section 482), cert. de-
nied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Rubin v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 1155, 1160 (1971) (same), aft'dper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
71. 42 T.C. at 117.
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bearing note. After this transaction, the taxpayer continued to manage
the dressmaking business but received no compensation for her ef-
forts. 72 The profits generated by the corporation from the dressmaking
enterprise were completely offset by net operating loss carryforwards
unused in prior years by the dairy business. In 1959, upon the request
of the taxpayer and for no consideration, the sons transferred their cor-
porate stock to her.73
The Commissioner relied upon four basic arguments to reallocate
the entire income of the dressmaking business to Ach for the years 1954
through 1958: (1) section 61 assignment of income; (2) sham corpora-
tion theory; (3) section 482 reallocation; and (4) section 269 bar against
tax avoidance acquisitions.74 Although a strong tax avoidance motive
was clearly indicated by the sale of the highly profitable dressmaking
business at book value in exchange for a noninterest bearing note,75 the
tax court did not regard the corporate entity as a sham. Instead, the
court relied upon section 482 to reallocate the income back to the
taxpayer.76
It is beyond dispute that Ach met the control requirement of sec-
tion 482.77 However, the question of whether the taxpayer could be
considered a trade, business or organization separate from the corpora-
tion remained. Judge Raum, writing for the tax court, found that Ach
did not cease to be a separate business or organization for purposes of
section 482 merely by selling the tangible assets of the dressmaking
business to the corporation.7" This finding was predicated upon the
fact that the assets transferred to the corporation did not include the
right to the taxpayer's services. 79 The tax court concluded, therefore,
that Ach continued in the dressmaking business even after its assets
were transferred to the corporation; in essense, she was considered an
organization separate and apart from the corporation .8 Although rely-
ing upon section 482, the tax court stated that section 269 would be
72. Id at 121.
73. Id at 122..
74. Id at 122-23, 127.
75. The tax avoidance purpose was to utilize the net operating losses of the corpora-
tion to offset the profits generated by the dress business.
76. Id. at 126-27. In addressing the alternative theories advanced by the Commis-
sioner, the court stated that the corporation was not a sham because there was a
genuine transfer of assets that were used in the corporation, the corporation had
salaried employees, and paid its federal and state tax obligations (including work-
men's compensation and social security). Id at 123-24. The court, however, did
not directly address why section 61 would not be applicable.
77. The court felt that the fact that all the stock was held by the taxpayer's sons was
irrelevant since the taxpayer had sufficient control to have the stock transferred to
her without consideration. Id. at 125.
78. Id at 124. The tax court described the transfer of assets by Ach to the corporation
as a "sale of naked assets" because no intangible assets were included. Id
79. Id at 124-25.
80. Id at 125. This result was evidently arrived at because no employment contract
had been entered into between Ach and the corporation, and there was no cove-
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equally applicable, since the taxpayer had a clear tax avoidance pur-
pose in transferring the dressmaking business assets to the corpora-
tion.8 Had Ach been decided solely upon the basis of section 269, the
unnecessary expansion of the dual business requirement of section 482
would have been avoided.82
B. Borge v. Commissioner
In Borge v. Commissioner, 83 a famous entertainer derived substan-
tial income from his lucrative career while, at the same time, operating
a poultry business at a substantial loss. Borge was advised by a tax
consultant that the Commissioner might disallow the losses from the
poultry business under a then-existing provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code which limited hobby losses.8 4 To avoid this possibility,
Borge transferred the assets of his poultry business to a newly formed
corporation in exchange for all of the corporation's stock. Borge con-
tracted with the corporation, giving it the right to his entertainment and
promotional services in return for compensation in an amount clearly
nant not to compete in existence. The tax court failed to consider the fact that an
employment contract and covenant not to compete are illusory in such a situation.
The tax court further found that the intangible assets of the sole proprietor-
ship, such as tradenames, were not transferred to the corporation. Id. at 124.
However, it is generally understood that when a business is sold, the intangible
assets follow the tangible; such intangibles do not exist separate and apart from
the tangible assets of a going concern.
To its credit, the tax court did not reallocate 100% of the income generated by
the corporation to Ach. Rather, it arbitrarily estimated that 30% of the income
was not attributable to the services provided by Ach, but to the dressmaking assets
owned by the corporation. Id at 127. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1930) was cited as authority for the estimate. Estimates of income subject to
reallocation under section 482 would appear imprecise at best. The better rule
would require the Commissioner to prove the exact amount of income to be
reallocated.
81. Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 128 (1964), af'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
82. For example, the Sixth Circuit reached the same result on appeal by relying on
section 269 and looking to the apparent tax avoidance motive of the transaction.
358 F.2d at 346. The troublesome "dual business" issue was never reached by the
appellate court, although subsequent decisions have relied upon this aspect of
Ach. See, e.g., Cooper v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 576 (1975). In Cooper, the tax-
payers incorporated a sole proprietorship engaged in construction. The assets
transferred into the corporation did not include buildings and equipment previ-
ously used in the sole proprietorship. Such assets were made available to the cor-
poration rent-free with the corporation paying for repairs and maintenance. The
corporation did not acquire any depreciable assets of its own. The tax court up-
held a section 482 reallocation whereby a reasonable rental charge was imputed
from the corporation to the taxpayers. As part of its opinion, the tax court found
that the taxpayers continued in business independently after the formation of the
corporation, citingAch as authority. Id at 580. The finding in Cooper of a dual
business also appears questionable.
83. 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 816 (1967), aft'd, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
84. 405 F.2d at 674 n.4.
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disproportionate to the income generated by those services.8 5 The cor-
poration then offset the losses sustained by the poultry business against
the profits generated by the entertainment business.
The Commissioner, relying upon sections 482 and 269, sought to
reallocate the income reported by the corporation to Borge. 6 The tax
court found, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that: (1) Borge was ac-
tively engaged in the entertainment business and assigned that income
to his corporation; (2) the corporation did nothing to earn or to assist
Borge in earning the entertainment income; and (3) the employment
contract between Borge and his corporation did not reflect an arm's-
length agreement because the entertainment services Borge provided
were worth substantially more than the salary he was paid by the cor-
poration.87 Therefore, it was determined that Borge was engaged in a
separate business and was in control of dual businesses for purposes of
section 482.88
It appears that the overwhelming tax avoidance purpose of the
85. Id. at 675.
86. Id
87. Id at n.6. The corporation reported the following income from entertainment
activities, before a deduction for the taxpayer's salary, for the years at issue:






However, the taxpayer received only $50,000 annual salary from the corpora-
tion during the above years, a sum clearly disproportionate to the income gener-
ated by his services.
88. Id at 676. Borge argued that section 482 could not properly be applied to him
since he could not be considered an "organization, trade or business," citing
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). In Whipple, the Supreme Court
held that a shareholder who rendered services to a corporation for purposes of
enhancing his investment could not be considered as engaging in a trade or busi-
ness. However, Whipple is distinguishable from Borge. The Second Circuit
found that Borge did not devote his time and energies to the corporation; rather,
he continued to carry on his entertainment career in exactly the same manner as
before the corporation was formed.
Borge also argued that Congress, in enacting the personal holding company,
I.R.C. §§ 541-47, and collapsible corporation, I.R.C. § 341, provisions of the code,
did not intend for section 482 to be applied to circumstances such as those in-
volved in Borge. The Second Circuit, however, refused to so construe the legisla-
tive history of those respective provisions:
In every case in which [section 482] is applied its application will neces-
sarily result in an apparent conflict with the literal requirements of some
other provision of the [Internal Revenue Code]. If this were not so, Sec-
tion 482 would be wholly superfluous. The fact that similar, but not
identical, factual situations have been dealt with by legislation does not
mean that this situation, because it was not also specifically dealt with by
legislation, cannot be reached even by a general code provision.
Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing National Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 320 U.S. 794
(1943)), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
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taxpayer in Borge resulted in imprecise legal reasoning by both the tax
and the appellate courts. If Congress had intended to include share-
holder-employees under section 482, it could easily have done so by
simply including "persons" in addition to organizations, trades, or
businesses.8 9 A proper holding in the case would have been to rely
exclusively upon section 269 or the assignment of income doctrine.
The section 482 reallocation in this case represents an unwarranted ex-
tension of that section beyond the scope of Congressional intent.
C Rubin v. Commissioner
Whether a shareholder-employee can be considered to be engaged
in a trade or business for purposes of section 482 was again raised in
Rubin v. Commissioner.90 While a shareholder and officer of Rubin
Brothers Corporation, the taxpayer obtained an option to acquire a
controlling interest in the stock of Dorman Mills, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of textiles and a substantial customer of
Rubin Brothers. During the time period involved, Dorman Mills had
continually sustained operating losses, but the taxpayer believed that
with better management Dorman Mills could be made to operate prof-
itably.9 Accordingly, a contract for the rendition of management serv-
ices was entered into between Dorman Mills and another corporation,
Park, which had been recently organized by the taxpayer. Park agreed
to provide management services to Dorman Mills for a period of four
years in return for compensation equal to twenty-five percent of Park's
net profits in excess of $25,000.92
During the term of the management contract, all management fees
paid by Dorman Mills to Park were attributable to services performed
solely by Rubin. Although Rubin generally respected the existence of
Park, Dorman Mills often ignored its existence and held Rubin out as
part of its own management, particularly when dealing with banking
and other financial institutions.93 As a result, parties dealing with
Dorman Mills were unaware of the existence of Park.
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer,
reallocating the management fee income reported by Park to Rubin.
The theory first advanced by the Commissioner was the assignment of
income doctrine. Prior to trial, however, the Commissioner amended
his answer to include a section 482 argument.94
89. See Lewis, Cumulated Earnings Tax-General, 35-4th TAX MGMT. A-3 (BNA)
(1975).
90. 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand,
56 T.C. 1155 (1971), afd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
91. 51 T.C. at 253-54.
92. Id. at 255.
93. Id at 263.
94. The validity of the corporation was not challenged by the Commissioner, but the
burden of proof with respect to the section 61 assignment of income issue was on
the taxpayer. On remand from the Second Circuit, the tax court failed to consider
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The tax court concluded that the assignment of income doctrine
was applicable. Although the corporation generated substantial in-
come in management fees, the income greatly exceeded the compen-
sation paid to the taxpayer.95 The Commissioner argued that the
substance of the arrangement was really an assignment by Rubin to
Park of the income derived from Rubin's direct services to Dorman
Mills. 6 The tax court stated that the taxpayer had the burden of prov-
ing that there was a substantial economic purpose for casting the trans-
action in the form chosen, but he had failed to meet it. 97
On appeal, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, stated
that "the broad sweep of section 61" has no applicability when "there is
a statutory provision adequate to deal with the problem presented
*"98 In remanding the case, the court stated:
Resort to section 482 is clearly superior to the blunt tool em-
ployed by the Tax Court. References to "substance over
form" and the "true earner" of income merely restate the is-
sue in cases like this: Who is the "true earner?" . . . . The
language of section 482 more clearly commands analysis of
the facts in terms of the competing policies outlined above.
Section 482 has other advantages. ft provides greater flex-
ibility than the all or nothing approach used by the Tax
Court. It is also accompanied by relief provisions to avoid the
hardship of the result reached by the Tax Court in this case,
the question of whether the burden of proof had shifted to the Commissioner after
amending his answer to include a new issue. See 56 T.C. 1155.
95. 51 T.C. at 265-66.
96. Id at 265.
97. Id at 265-69. The tax court relied upon the fact that the taxpayer had not agreed
to render services exclusively to Park. However, it has been suggested that the
presence or absence of a covenant not to compete in a closely held or one-man
corporation is largely irrelevant. Since the shareholder-employee in a one-man
corporation is both employee and owner, the exclusivity of a contract is unen-
forceable and without substance. Nevertheless, emphasis is still placed upon the
presence or absence of this agreement. See, e.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.
114, 128 (1964) (taxpayer never entered into employment contract or issued a cove-
nant not to compete to corporation, therefore taxpayer continued as a business
separate from the corporation), af'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966); see also Borge v. Commissioner, 26 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 816,
818 (1967) (taxpayer never agreed to provide his services on an exclusive basis to
his corporation), aftd, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh 'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). But cf. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 872
(7th Cir. 1980) (absence of employment contract or covenant not to compete is
irrelevant in case of a one-man corporation because such agreements can be re-
scinded at will; rather, controlling factor was that shareholder worked exclusively
for his corporation at all times), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and re-
manded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1031
(1981) (lack of a covenant not to compete is irrelevant when one-man corporation
is involved and employment relationship was maintained at all times), appeal
docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982).
98. Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155
(1971), ajf'dper curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
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which would require Rubin to pay taxes on money he has
never received and could not now obtain without paying in-
come taxes on the receipt . . .99
The Second Circuit did not, however, address the issue of whether the
taxpayer in Rubin could be considered as engaging in a separate trade
or business or be classified as an organization for purposes of applying
section 482.
On remand, the tax court relied upon the decisions in Ach and
Borge, holding that the income received by Park was properly subject
to reallocation under section 4 82 .1°° The tax court placed emphasis
upon the fact that the taxpayer was an officer of Dorman Mills prior to
the formation of Park and drew an analogy to Ach and Borge which
involved individuals engaged in a separate business prior to in-
corporation. °'
The decision of the tax court on remand was again appealed to the
Second Circuit. Finding no substantial difference between Rubin and
the earlier decisions ofAch and Borge, the Second Circuit held that the
taxpayer's rendition of management services to Dorman Mills was a
trade or business factually similar to the furnishing of entertainment by
the taxpayer in Borge, and hence within the scope of section 482.102
Taxpayers who incorporate their personal service business may
draw hope from the second holding of the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong
v. Commissioner. 103 The court held that section 482 is inapplicable
when an employee works exclusively for his corporation because the
threshold "dual business" requirement is not met.' °4 The impact of
this decision, however, is unclear. The Seventh Circuit recognized the
apparent conflict between its holding in Foglesong II and the decisions
of the Second Circuit in Rubin and Borge and the Sixth Circuit inAch.
However, it distinguished and approved those decisions instead of criti-
cizing them. 10'
99. 429 F.2d at 653.
100. 56 T.C. at 1162.
101. Id at 1159-62. The tax court deviated somewhat from the opinion of the Second
Circuit by stating:
We merely hold, as is the clear import of both the Ach and Borge deci-
sions, that where the particular facts of a case are such as to justify a
finding that a shareholder operated an independent business and merely
assigned to the corporation a portion of the income therefrom, the busi-
ness activity of the taxpayer may constitute a trade or business ....
Id at 1161.
102. 460 F.2d at 1218.
103. 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
104. Id at 851.
105. Borge and Rubin were distinguished on the basis that the taxpayers did not work
exclusively for their corporations and were, therefore, engaged in separate busi-
nesses. Ach, in which the taxpayer did work exclusively for her corporation, was
distinguished on the ground that the taxpayer retained sufficient aspects of her
sole proprietor business to meet the dual business requirement. Id at 852.
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V. AVOIDING A SECTION 482 REALLOCATION
The key to avoiding a reallocation of personal service income is
proper corporate planning and adherence to the policies and proce-
dures which such planning entails. The following sections analyze the
factors which the courts have considered in determining the legitimacy
of reallocation. While the cases are grouped according to the factor
primarily at issue in each, no one factor is ever determinative and the
cases necessarily overlap.
A. Components of Proper Planning
1. Corporate Formalities
The advisability of following all corporate formalities is empha-
sized by the decision in Gettler v. Commissioner. '0 The petitioner was
an attorney who formed a law partnership with two other attorneys
specializing in the practice of labor law. Petitioner, one of the other
partners, and a lay individual formed a corporation to handle labor
matters for employers. The corporation was formed for two reasons:
to permit the representation of management in labor matters,'07 and to
permit the inclusion of a lay individual who could not ethically be a
partner in the law partnership.
l0 8
The corporation had only three clients, operated out of the same
offices as the partnership, and utilized secretarial services provided by
the partnership. However, the corporation paid rent to the partnership
for the office space, and corporate formalities were always followed.
For example, receipts of the partnership and the corporation were seg-
regated and maintained in separate bank accounts, and separate sta-
tionery was used. Additionally, the fees received by the corporation
were not paid out in full as expenses, but instead a large percentage was
retained to purchase art investments as a sideline activity of the
corporation. 1o9
The Commissioner argued that, under the assignment of income
doctrine and section 482, the income in question was earned by the
partnership and not by the corporation. 0 The tax court, however, re-
fused to adopt this position and held that a taxpayer may validly divide
his business, provided each unit is operated independently of the other
and a business purpose is shown for such an arrangement."' In Get-
tier, the corporation was formed for substantial nontax considera-
106. 34 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 443 (1975).
107. Since the partnership represented labor unions, the partners felt that it was not
practical for them to also represent management. Id at 443-44.
108. Since labor matters could be handled by a corporation, because such representa-
tion was not then considered involving the practice of law, a nonlawyer could be a
shareholder. Id
109. Id at 443-44, 448.
110. Id at 447-48.
111. Id at 448.
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tions. "' The fact that the corporation had no employees other than the
partners and operated out of partnership office space did not, without
more, mean that the partnership was the true earner of the income.
Thus, proper adherence to corporate formalities and the lack of a sub-
stantial tax avoidance purpose defeated the Commissioner's attempt to
reallocate the corporation's income. 113
2. Employment Contracts and Reasonable Compensation
The existence of an employment contract between a shareholder-
employee and his corporation, as well as the payment of reasonable
compensation is crucial to avoid a section 482 reallocation. In Jordan v.
Commissioner, 114 the taxpayer was an individual who organized a
corporation for the purpose of selling insurance. Shortly thereafter, an-
other corporation was organized by the taxpayer to provide manage-
ment services to the insurance corporation. All such services were
performed personally by the taxpayer.'1I During the years at issue, the
insurance company received commissions of approximately $239,000,
of which $158,000 was paid to the management company as the fee for
its services. However, the taxpayer received no compensation from the
corporation.
In his notice of deficiency to the petitioner, the Commissioner real-
located all of the income received by the management company to the
petitioner under both the assignment of income doctrine and section
482.116 The tax court upheld the Commissioner's reallocation. The ev-
idence produced at trial established that in addition to the lack of com-
pensation, no employment contract was entered into between the
taxpayer and the management corporation, and little regard was given
to the separate legal existence of that corporation."
17
The importance of employment contracts and receiving reasonable
compensation from a controlled personal service corporation is also il-
lustrated in Estate of Cole v. Commissioner. 118 The taxpayer was a
famous entertainer who organized a foreign corporation to promote his
overseas tours. The taxpayer entered into an employment contract
with the foreign corporation providing for compensation at the rate of
112. Id at 449.
113. This result was also reached in Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881, 896-900
(1981) where the only business purpose was to receive increased retirement plan
benefits.
114. 60 T.C. 872 (1973), aff'dper curiam, 514 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1975).
115. 60 T.C. at 878.
116. Id at 882-83.
117. Id at 883; see also American Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971) (tax-
payers never entered into an employment contract with their corporation and no
compensation was ever paid; reallocation upheld). But cf. Keller v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981) (taxpayer observed all formalities, including an employ-
ment contract, and was adequately compensated for his efforts; reallocation
reversed), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982).
118. 32 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 313 (1973).
[Vol. 12
Section 482 Reallocation
$8,500 per week for personal appearances made overseas. 9
The Commissioner sought to reallocate the income earned by the
corporation to the taxpayer on the basis of both the assignment of in-
come doctrine and section 482.120 In considering the section 482 argu-
ment, the tax court held that the Commissioner's determination was
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.' 2' Reliance was placed upon
the fact that an employment contract existed between the parties and
that the Commissioner had not challenged the reasonableness of the
compensation paid to the taxpayer by the corporation. The court
found this compensation to be equivalent to what the taxpayer could
have earned from a noncontrolled corporation for essentially the same
services. Therefore, the arm's-length standard of section 482 was
met. '
22
3. Investment of Capital and Utilization of Nonshareholder
Employees
In contrast to personal service businesses, the courts are reluctant
to reallocate income when capital and the services of nonshareholder
employees are income-producing factors. The case of Davis v. Commis-
sioner 23 is illustrative. In Davis, the taxpayer was an orthopedic sur-
geon who acquired an x-ray machine and physical therapy equipment
in order to provide treatment for his patients. Anticipating divorce,
concerned about the future welfare of his children, and fearful of po-
tential legal liability in the event of a mishap occurring with respect to
the x-ray equipment, the taxpayer transferred the x-ray business and
the physical therapy activity to two separate corporations. 24 Both
businesses were established as Subchapter S corporations and all but
ten percent of the stock in each was given to Davis' children, with the
allocable share of net income from each corporation distributed to sav-
ings accounts maintained for each child. 125
The corporation providing x-ray services employed a registered x-
ray technician and owned all of its equipment except the x-ray
machine, which was leased to it by the taxpayer. The corporation
providing physical therapy services employed a registered physical
therapist and two aides and owned various pieces of physical therapy
equipment. As president and a member of the board of directors of
both coiTorations the taxpayer performed purely administrative
services.
119. Id at 315.
120. Id at 320, 324.
121. Id at 325.
122. Id.; see also Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982).
123. 64 T.C. 1034 (1975).
124. Id at 1035.
125. Id at 1038.
126. Id at 1041.
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The Commissioner sought to reallocate the entire income gener-
ated by the two corporations to the taxpayer under the assignment of
income theory and section 482.27 The primary argument advanced by
the Commissioner was that the earnings of the two corporations were
under the control of the taxpayer, and therefore taxable directly to him.
However, the facts did not support this argument. The income of
the two corporations was generated by the services of persons em-
ployed, and the equipment owned, by each corporation, not by any
services performed by the taxpayer. The Commissioner cited Ach as
support for the proposition that the taxpayer controlled the income
generated by the two corporations. Rejecting the Commissioner's the-
ory, the tax court distinguishedAch on the basis that the services of the
taxpayer in Ach were vital to the corporation, whereas in the present
case they were not. 28
The decision in Davis indicates that when equipment and the serv-
ices of unrelated employees are utilized by a personal service corpora-
tion, it is unlikely that the Commissioner will be able to sustain a
reallocation of corporate income. Assuming that all other corporate
formalities are followed, the argument that income is earned by the
controlling shareholder-employee is weak.
B. Tax Court Trends
The tax court increasingly recognizes the validity of personal serv-
ice corporations for tax purposes and rejects the Commissioner's
attempts to reallocate such income to shareholders when corporate for-
malities are observed. The decision of the tax court in Pacella v. Com-
missioner 129 confirms this trend.
In Pacella, the taxpayer was a physician specializing in psychiatry.
In addition to conducting a private practice, Pacella also operated a
private psychiatric hospital as a sole proprietor. Although Pacella as-
sisted in the hospital management, another individual managed its day-
to-day affairs. In 1970, Pacella incorporated and became the sole share-
holder of his private psychiatric practice due to anticipated tax bene-
fits."' Pacella then entered into an employment contract with the
corporation stipulating that he would devote substantially all of his
time to the corporation's business. The corporation adopted a pension
plan; however, the contributions were largely attributable to coverage
of Pacella, since he and a secretary were the only plan participants.
Shortly after incorporation, a meeting was held between Pacella,
the hospital administrator, and other staff members. It was agreed that
all patients at the hospital treated by Pacella would be billed by his
127. Id. at 1042.
128. Id at 1046.
129. 78 T.C. 604 (1982).
130. Id at 606.
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corporation.' After this meeting, the corporation submitted bills to
the hospital for services rendered by Pacella and the hospital remitted
checks payable to the corporation. However, no written agreement was
ever executed to reflect this arrangement. 32
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency reallocating the
income received by the corporation to Pacella under the assignment of
income doctrine and section 482.133 The tax court held section 482 to
be the proper authority and divided its analysis of the case into two
steps: (1) whether the corporation controlled the earning of the income
sought to be reallocated; and (2) whether the total compensation paid
by the corporation to Pacella reflected an arm's-length agreement. 34
Under the first step, the corporation, rather than the taxpayer, was
found to control the earning of the income.1 35 The determinative fac-
tor appears to be that the corporation was able to conduct its business
only because it had contracted for Pacella's services. 136  Although
Pacella did teach and provide consulting services to other hospitals,
these activities did not involve clinical treatment. Therefore, the serv-
ices were held not to infringe upon the exclusiveness of Pacella's em-
ployment contract with the corporation. The fact that the corporation
did not have a written contract with the hospital was not a critical fac-
tor either, because the tax court concluded that an oral agreement had
131. Id at 608-09.
132. Id at 609.
133. Id at 611.
134. The facts of the case are not clear as to the reallocation the Commissioner would
require. The tax court indicates that the Commissioner amended his answer to
the taxpayer's petition using figures different than those contained in the notice
of deficiency. Apparently, the Commissioner's reallocation would have required
Pacella to include on his individual return all of the income reported by the cor-
poration other than that attributable to billings to the petitioner's hospital, and
would have allowed him to deduct the business expenses claimed by the corpora-
tion except for certain items not permitted to a sole proprietor (i.e., increased
pension plan contributions). The Commissioner also would have required that
Pacella, as a sole proprietor, be denied the deductions claimed on his Schedule C
for payments made to the corporation for services rendered to hospital patients.
The tax court took a different approach, framing the issue in the case as whether
the Commissioner could reallocate the "net income" of the corporation to Pacella.
Id at 605. This conforms to the approach taken by some courts - that of making
allocations of net income rather than of income and deductions separately. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text. In Pacella a strict net income allocation
would not be proper, since the corporation claimed deductions for pension plan
contributions in excess of those that could be claimed by Pacella as a sole
proprietor.
135. Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604, 618-19 (1982).
136. There was a considerable question at trial as to the authenticity of the employ-
ment contract and the corporate minutes. The Commissioner alleged that the
documents were backdated and sought to use ink analysis in an attempt to show
that the ink used to sign and date the documents was not in existence at the time
the documents were allegedly signed. The tax court decided that the state of art in
ink analysis was not yet generally accepted by the scientific community and held
the documents to be authentic. Id at 614-17.
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been made during the meeting held between Pacella's corporation and
the hospital. 37
The tax court then focused upon whether Pacefla was compen-
sated by the corporation in an amount that would have been reason-
able had the parties been unrelated. 138 The test used by the court to
determine whether an arm's-length agreement existed was whether the
total compensation package approximated that which Pacella could
have earned absent incorporation. 39 Taking into account salary and
pension plan contributions made by the corporation on Pacella's be-
half, the court concluded that the arm's-length test had been met. 14
Although Pacella's total income was less than what he could have
earned absent incorporation, he gained comparable benefit from the
pension plan contributions that were not currently taxable to him.
This reasoning permits some leeway in designing a compensation
package for the shareholder of a personal service corporation. The
shareholder-employee may withdraw less from the corporation in total
compensation than he would have earned as a sole proprietor if the
compensation package includes pension plan contributions made on
his behalf.
The trend toward recognizing the validity of personal service cor-
porations is further evidenced by the tax court's decision in Keller v.
Commissioner,'' and indirectly by subsequent legislation enacted by
Congress to limit the Keller decision. The taxpayer, Keller, was a
member of a partnership which rendered pathology services to local
hospitals and physicians. Keller formed a professional corporation
137. Id at 619. The court further held that former patients were on notice that the
services were being rendered by the professional corporation, not by Pacella as a
sole proprietor. The fact that the corporate name, including the "P.C." designa-
tion, was on the sign to the office suite, biUllheads and office stationery led to the
court's conclusion that the patients were those of the corporation. Id
138. Id at 620-22.
139. Id. at 619-20.
140. Id at 620-22. However, a recent memorandum decision of the tax court, Morri-
son v. Commissioner, 44 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1459 (1982) illustrates that
care must be exercised when the income of the corporation from the personal
services of shareholders is increasing while total compensation (including pension
plan contributions and other fringe benefits) paid by the corporation to the share-
holder remains constant. In Morrison the Commissioner sought to reallocate in-
come from a personal service corporation to its sole shareholder Morrison for the
years 1974 to 1977, pursuant to section 482. The court sanctioned a reallocation for
1977 only. In the other three years Morrison received compensation which was
comparable to what he would have received absent incorporation once pension
plan contributions were taken into account. However, in 1977 the total income of
the corporation increased by one and one-third while the taxpayer's total compen-
sation remained constant. The tax court determined that the taxpayer would have
received more compensation if an arm's-length arrangement existed in 1977 since
the increase in income was due solely to Morrison's efforts. Id at 1470-71.




under state law and became the sole shareholder. The corporation and
Keller then entered into an employment contract in which he agreed to
devote his full time and efforts to the corporation in return for an an-
nual salary. The partnership agreement was amended, with the profes-
sional corporation substituted for Keller as a partner. Thereafter, the
distributive share of partnership income allocated to the corporation
was reported by it on its tax return. A pension plan was established by
the corporation, and substantial contributions were made on behalf of
Keller to the plan. The earnings of the corporation were derived only
from the partnership, which did not engage in any other substantial
business activity. The Commissioner sought to reallocate the entire in-
come reported by the corporation to Keller under section 482.142
In discussing the major hurdle imposed by the dual business re-
quirement of section 482, the tax court stated:
The dual business requirement is not a preclusive obstacle to
the application of [s]ection 482 in this case. It has been noted
that the legislative history of the predecessor of [s]ection 482
suggests that the terms 'trade,' 'business,' and 'organization'
are to be broadly construed . . . . Furthermore, the regula-
tions promulgated under [s]ection 482 are broadly written so
as to cover any type of entity or enterprise which has
independent tax significance . . . . Other courts and this
[c]ourt have not been reluctant to rely upon [s]ection 482 in a
shareholder/cororation context and in a sole employee/cor-
poration case. 4
According to the tax court, section 482 does not authorize an allo-
cation of income which would otherwise disregard the validity of a cor-
poration. The Commissioner was held, therefore, to have exceeded his
authority to reallocate income under section 482.'44 The key consider-
ation in Keller was whether the total compensation, including retire-
ment plan contributions and other fringe benefits, paid to or on behalf
of Keller was substantially equivalent to what he could have received
absent incorporation. 14 Finding that it was, the tax court held that the
142. 77 T.C. at 1022.
143. Id at 1022-23 (citations omitted). The holding of the tax court that the dual busi-
ness requirement imposed by section 482 could be met by a mere employment
relationship between a shareholder and his corporation conflicts directly with the
most recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691
F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). However, the decision in Keller has been appealed to the
Tenth Circuit. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No.
82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982). The Tenth Circuit may follow the approach of
the Second Circuit in Rubin v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) in
holding section 482 can be applied, or that of the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong
finding that the dual business requirement is not met in this situation.
144. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1025 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982).
145. 77 T.C. at 1025. The court did not state that the test should be determined by
reference to what a similar employee could make in another organization, but
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arm's-length standard imposed by section 482 was satisfied. 146
Nevertheless, a portion of the corporation's income was validly
reallocated to Keller. After incorporation, the corporation was not im-
mediately substituted as a partner in the medical partnership. There-
fore, Keller was held directly taxable on that portion of the income
earned prior to the date of the substitution. 147
Congress found reason to object to the decision in Keller. Without
waiting for the final outcome of the case on appeal, it took action to
combat the perceived abuse in Keller by enacting section 269A. l4 8 Sec-
rather what the taxpayer could have earned absent incorporation. The arm's-
length standard could be applied more accurately by comparing what the share-
holder-employee's compensation would be if he were an employee of a similar
enterprise.
146. The fact that the employment contract entered into between the corporation and
Keller lacked a covenant not to compete was irrelevant. The tax court stated that
a corporation can perform services only through its agents, whether it be a one-
man corporation or a large conglomerate. The fact that Keller entered into an
employment relationship with a corporation and rendered services exclusively to
it during the years in question was found to be decisive. Id at 1032.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wilbur indicated that the facts in Keller were
similar to those in Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969). The dissent
viewed Keller's corporation as a mere paper corporation held together by a set of
bookkeeping entries and bank accounts, and indicated that the assignment of in-
come doctrine could be used to disregard the corporation altogether. Keller v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1036-37 (1981) (Wilbur, J., dissenting), appealdock-
eted, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982). Judge Wilbur's highly restrictive ap-
proach toward personal service corporations is also found in the dissenting
opinion in the Seventh Circuit's first decision in Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621
F.2d 865, 873 (7th Cir. 1980) (Wood, J., dissenting), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102
(1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
147. Although the tax court utilized section 482 to support its opinion, dictum indicates
that the section 61 assignment of income doctrine will continue to be utilized by
the court in dealing with personal service corporations. Keller v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 1014, 1033-34 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. Apr. 7,
1982).
148. Section 269A was added to the Internal Revenue Code by TEFRA, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). It provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 269A. PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS FORMED
OR AVAILED OF TO AVOID OR EVADE INCOME TAX.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-If-
(1) substantially all of the services of a personal service corporation
are performed for (or on behalf of) another corporation, part-
nership, or other entity, and
(2) the principal purpose for forming, or availing of such personal
service corporation is avoidance or evasion of Federal income
tax by reducing the income of, or securing the benefit of any
expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance for any
employee-owner which would not otherwise be available, then,
the Secretary may allocate all income, deductions, credits, ex-
clusions, and other allowances between such personal service
corporation and its employee-owners, if such allocation is nec-
essary to prevent avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax or
clearly to reflect the income of the personal service corporation
or any of its employee-owners.
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tion 269A permits the Commissioner to reallocate income and deduc-
tions of a corporation which renders substantially all of its services to
one other entity, if the principal purpose of forming or utilizing the
corporation is to avoid federal taxes or to secure the benefit of a deduc-
tion or credit not otherwise allowed to a self-employed individual. 4 9
Corporations subject to section 269A are those principally providing
personal services rendered by employees who, directly or indirectly,
own ten percent or more of the corporation's stock.'5 °
Section 269A is clearly designed to attack the situation in Keller
when the personal service corporation renders substantially all of its
services to another organization through an owner-employee. From a
practical standpoint such corporations lack independent significance.
However, section 269A does not affect the situation where a personal
service corporation is providing services to more than one entity or to
the general public at large. The implication is that by enacting section
269A, Congress acknowledged the validity of personal service corpora-
tions for tax purposes."'
(b) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) Personal service corporation.-The term 'personal service cor-
poration' means a corporation the principal activity of which is
the performance of personal services and such services are sub-
stantially performed by employee-owners.
(2) Employee-owner.-The term 'employee-owner' means any em-
ployee who owns, on any day during the taxable year, more
than 10 percent of the outstanding stock of the personal service
corporation. For purposes of the preceding sentence, section
318 shall apply, except that '5 percent' shall be substituted for
'50 percent' in section 318(a)(2)(C).
(c) RELATED PERSONS.-All related persons (within the meaning of
section 106(b)(6)(C)) shall be treated as one entity.
I.R.C. § 269A. The legislative history indicates that Congress specifically in-
tended to overturn Keller whenever the corporation appears to serve no business
purpose other than to generate tax benefits not available to self-employed individ-
uals. H. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 634, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 412.
149. I.R.C. § 269A(a).
150. Id. (b)(2).
151. The legislative history also indicates that formation of a corporation to achieve
more favorable retirement plan benefits will not be taken into account in later
years. Sen. Robert Dole stated on the floor of the Senate that since parity between
self-employed and corporate retirement plans will be achieved in 1984, it is ex-
pected that the Commissioner will not take a corporation's retirement plan into
account in determining the applicability of section 269A. 11 CONG. REC. S 10903
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Dole). Beginning in 1984, one issue
addressed by section 269A will no longer be present. As discussed earlier, see
supra note 3, TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982), has established
parity between retirement plans for self-employed individuals and corporations.
Therefore, the attainment of more favorable retirement plan benefits will no
longer be an underlying reason for incorporation of a personal service business.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The principal weapon in the Commissioner's arsenal for combat-
ting the spread of personal service corporations is a reallocation of in-
come under section 482. Such a reallocation requires that two or more
organizations, trades or businesses be in existence. The courts appear
to be split as to whether an employee can be considered a separate
trade, business or organization for purposes of an income reallocation.
While arguably this is an unwarranted extension of the scope of section
482, to date only the Seventh Circuit has so held.
A section 482 reallocation will be reversed only if the Commis-
sioner's determination is shown to be capricious, arbitrary or unreason-
able. The standard of arm's-length dealing must be established to meet
this burden of proof. To satisfy the arm's-length standard, compensa-
tion paid by the personal service corporation to the shareholder-em-
ployee must be reasonable. The tax court has interpreted this to mean
that the compensation must be comparable to what the shareholder-
employee could have earned if the business had remained unincorpo-
rated. However, such compensation may include contributions the cor-
poration makes on the employee's behalf to retirement and other fringe
benefit plans.
Strict compliance with all corporate formalities, including use of
written employment contracts, covenants not to compete, contracts be-
tween the corporation and its customers, and the payment of reason-
able compensation should satisfy the arm's-length standard imposed by
section 482. This is not to say that the Commissioner will not continue
to litigate such cases. Indeed, the proper application of section 482
with respect to the reallocation of a personal service corporation's in-
come is just beginning to be defined. Recent decisions of the tax court
and Seventh Circuit do, however, indicate a trend toward recognizing
the personal service corporation as a valid tax planning tool.
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